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Abstract: Current audit guidance (AU-C § 570) requires the auditor to modify their 
opinion in the presence of significant doubt about the firm’s ability to continue as a going 
concern.  Prior literature has examined firm and auditor characteristics that act as 
determinants of the auditor’s reporting choice.  This paper extends the literature by 
examining the dynamic role of managerial ability in the auditor’s reporting decision.  
Managerial ability refers to the idiosyncratic impact of management on firm performance.  
In order to proxy for managerial ability, I use a contemporary measurement that estimates 
the incremental impact of management on the firm’s ability to generate revenues from 
operational inputs.  I posit that managerial ability improves the accuracy of the auditor’s 
opinion through its positive impact on the accuracy of the prospective financial 
information utilized by the auditor.  However, documented results demonstrate that high 
managerial ability is associated with a clean opinion regardless of the subsequent 
viability of the firm, simultaneously decreasing the occurrence of false positives and 
increasing the occurrence of false negatives.  I also posit that managerial ability impacts 
the auditor’s reporting decision by changing the way that the auditor utilizes financial 
condition information.  Documented results demonstrate that the auditor’s opinion is less 
sensitive to prominent signals of financial distress when managerial ability is high than 
when managerial ability is low.  My analyses contribute broadly to literature examining 
managerial ability as well as literature examining the determinants and accuracy of the 
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Empirical research in the areas of accounting, management, and finance provides evidence that 
managers impact firm operations and financial reporting (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Dyreng, 
Hanlon, and Maydew 2010; Bamber, Jiang, and Wang 2010; Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang 2011).  
Contemporary works quantify managerial ability by estimating the idiosyncratic impact of 
management on firm performance (Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 2012; Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, 
and McVay 2013).  Analyses of managerial ability in the research literature primarily focus on 
firm-specific outputs (e.g. earnings management, earnings forecasts, and tax strategies) that are 
clear products of management decisions (Demerjian et al. 2013; Baik, Farber, and Lee 2011; 
Francis, Sun, and Wu 2013).  A contemporary work by Krishnan and Wang (2014) breaks from 
this focus and documents that managerial ability influences the decisions of a key external 
stakeholder – the independent auditor.  I extend this literature and examine in detail the ways in 
which managerial ability impacts the auditor’s going concern reporting decision.  
Within the U.S. financial reporting environment, financial statements are presented under the 
assumption that the firm will continue as a going concern in future periods.  Current audit 
guidance requires the auditor to assess this assumption using information obtained while 
performing audit procedures as well as other relevant information obtained from management 




continue as a going concern, he or she is responsible to express this doubt through a modified 
going concern audit report (GCAR).  Prior research demonstrates that the GCAR is relevant and 
useful for market valuation of firm securities (Fleak and Wilson 1994; Jones 1996; Menon and 
Williams 2010; Shipman, Swanquist, and Whited 2013; Carson et al. 2013).  As such, it is 
valuable to understand the factors that influence the type of opinion issued (clean or GCAR) as 
well as the accuracy of the audit opinion. 
The auditor’s objective is to issue an opinion that minimizes the expected costs of client 
dissatisfaction from the issuance of an incorrect GCAR and litigation, censure, and reputation 
loss from the issuance of an incorrect clean opinion (Carson et al. 2013; Matsumura, 
Subramanyam, and Tucker 1997; Tucker, Matsumura, and Subramanyam 2003).  To meet this 
objective, the auditor strives to form an accurate prediction of the firm’s future viability.  Prior 
literature demonstrates that the auditor’s reporting decision is sensitive to information that signals 
firm viability or distress.  Current audit guidance directs the auditor to work with management 
when assessing the going concern assumption (AU-C § 570) and practitioner interviews reveal 
that audit partners consider their assessment of management to be a critical input into their 
reporting decision (Mutchler 1984; Kleinman and Anandarajan 1999).   
Krishnan and Wang (2014) document evidence that managerial ability is positively associated 
with the issuance of a clean audit opinion.  I extend their work and explore how managerial 
ability impacts the auditor’s going concern reporting decision.  My work first examines the 
association between managerial ability and the accuracy of the audit opinion.  When financial 
conditions raise initial doubt about the ability of the company to continue as a going concern, 
extant audit guidance directs the auditor to consider management’s plans to mitigate threats to the 
firm’s viability (AU-C § 570.10).  The guidance notes that management-prepared prospective 
information may be a critical component of such plans that the auditor must evaluate (AU-C § 




accurate prospective information relative to managers of low ability (Demerjian et al. 2013, Baik 
et al. 2011).  I posit that, to the extent that managerial ability improves the accuracy of 
prospective information available to the auditor, managerial ability improves the reporting 
accuracy of the auditor. 
My work also examines the impact of managerial ability on the auditor’s use of financial 
condition information.  Theoretical, experimental, and some archival studies indicate that the 
auditor interacts information, prioritizes information, and utilizes information differently under 
different environmental conditions (Brown and Solomon 1990; Rosman, Seol, and Biggs 1999; 
Bonner 2008; Leone, Rice, Weber, and Willenborg 2013; Goh, Krishnan, and Li 2013).  
However, archival analyses of the going concern opinion have not prominently explored how the 
auditor may utilize the most prominent indicators of financial distress (i.e. constrained cash and 
high leverage) differently under different environments.  Given that prior literature demonstrates 
a pervasive impact of management on firm practices and viability, I posit that high managerial 
ability impacts the environment in which the auditor makes their going concern opinion decision 
and causes the auditor to be less sensitive to indicators of distressed financial conditions. 
Finally, my work examines the moderating role of auditor independence in the relationship 
between managerial ability and the issuance of a GCAR.  Auditor-client negotiation literature 
demonstrates that managers may retain agency and bargaining power by acting proactively in 
their identification of accounting issues and in their communication regarding accounting issues 
(McCracken, Salterio, and Gibbins 2008).  Empirical findings within the literature are consistent 
with the premise that managers of high ability act proactively (Baik et al. 2011; Andreou, Ehrlich, 
and Louca 2013; Wang 2013).  As such, the negative relationship documented between 
managerial ability and the issuance of a GCAR may be due, in part, to the bargaining power that 
high ability managers maintain in their negotiations with the auditor.  Audit quality literature 




characteristics (e.g. auditor size, engagement economic significance, auditor industry 
specialization, and auditor tenure).  I posit that these prominent proxies for auditor independence 
moderate the documented negative relationship between managerial ability and the issuance of a 
GCAR. 
I test my hypotheses by estimating a multivariate model with the auditor’s opinion as the 
dependent variable.  In order to proxy for managerial ability, I use the measurement developed by 
Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012).  These authors measure firm efficiency (relative to other 
firms in the same industry) based on the firm’s transformation of resources into revenues.  They 
then estimate the management-specific component of this firm efficiency score and use this as a 
measurement of managerial ability.  Subsequent research supports the validity of this 
measurement as a proxy for managerial ability (Demerjian et al. 2013; Baik et al. 2011; Andreou 
et al. 2013; Wang 2013).  I model the auditor’s opinion as a function of managerial ability (along 
with control variables) and estimate the model under sub-samples of firm-years that subsequently 
remain viable and firm-years that subsequently fail in order to examine the relationship between 
managerial ability and opinion accuracy.  I also model the interaction of managerial ability with 
prominent financial characteristics and with auditor independence proxies to examine the 
dynamic relationship between managerial ability and the audit opinion. 
The results of my analyses demonstrate that managerial ability is associated with a clean audit 
opinion regardless of the firm’s subsequent bankruptcy status.  That is, managerial ability is 
simultaneously associated with a decrease in Type 1 reporting errors (“false positives” - the 
auditor incorrectly issues a GCAR) and an increase in Type 2 reporting errors (“false negatives” - 
the auditor incorrectly issues a clean opinion).  My results also demonstrate that previously-
documented relationships between financial condition variables (cash levels, leverage, operating 
cash flows, and bankruptcy probability) and the auditor’s opinion are moderated by managerial 




financial condition information in performing their assessment.  The auditor appears to be less 
sensitive to prominent signals of distress when managerial ability is high than when managerial 
ability is low.  Finally, I find no evidence that auditor independence moderates the negative 
relationship between managerial ability and the issuance of a GCAR. 
My work contributes to extant accounting literature in several ways.  First, my work contributes 
to research examining the determinants of the auditor’s opinion.  Surveyed audit partners identify 
management performance as a prominent cue impacting their reporting decision (Mutchler 1984).  
Archival GCAR studies have not prominently examined management characteristics as 
determinants of the auditor’s opinion.  Kleinman and Anandarajan (1999) posit that analysis of 
the role of management is missing in the literature partly because the auditor’s knowledge of 
management is subjective and difficult to model.  Krishnan and Wang (2014) provide a critical 
step forward in the literature by demonstrating a baseline relationship between managerial ability 
and the auditor’s reporting decision.  I extend the literature by documenting evidence of the 
dynamic way in which management impacts the auditor’s use of financial condition information. 
Second, my work highlights the importance of modeling interactions among variables when 
examining auditor reporting.  Theoretical and experimental studies prominently demonstrate that 
the auditor interacts information, prioritizes information, and utilizes information differently 
under different environmental conditions (Brown and Solomon 1990; Rosman et al. 1999; Bonner 
2008).  However, such analyses using archival data are rare.  Using interaction terms in the 
estimation of a multivariate model, I find evidence that the strength of prominent determinants of 
the auditor’s opinion varies according to managerial ability levels.  This demonstrates that it is 
valuable and appropriate to consider interactions and environmental conditions in order to better 




Finally, my work contributes to discussion of GCAR error rates.  Carson et al. (2013) provide 
summary statistics for financial reporting from 2000 to 2010.  They note that 98.31% of GCARs 
are false positives (Type 1 errors) while only 0.21% of clean opinions are false negatives (Type 2 
errors).  The Center for Audit Quality identifies the high proportion of false positives (Type 1 
errors) as an area of concern that prior research has not fully explored (CAQ 2012).  A Type 1 
error occurs when the auditor is overly-conservative in their assessment of firm viability.  My 
analyses indicate that managerial ability influences the auditor to report less conservatively.  
While this is generally desirable, my analyses also demonstrate that the relationship holds even in 
situations where the auditor should report conservatively (i.e. when the firm subsequently files for 
bankruptcy).  My analyses are beneficial to practitioners as they assess the sensitivity of their 
judgments to management’s influence. 
This paper is organized as follows:  In section II, I review prior literature related to the going 
concern opinion and managerial ability.  In section III, I develop hypotheses of the potential ways 
that managerial ability impacts the audit opinion.  These hypotheses relate to the impact of 
managerial ability on audit opinion accuracy, the interaction of managerial ability with financial 
condition information, and the interaction of managerial ability with auditor independence.  In 
section IV, I develop multivariate models to test the hypotheses, describe my sample selection 
procedures, and discuss sample descriptive statistics.  In section V, I discuss the results of my 
multivariate analyses.  I discuss additional analyses in section VI and summarize my results, 







REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The Going Concern Opinion 
The term “going concern” refers to a company’s ability to remain viable and continue operations 
in future periods without significant intervention.1   Financial statements are prepared under the 
assumption that the entity will continue as a going concern.  Current audit guidance (AU-C § 570, 
formerly SAS 59) requires the auditor to assess the ability of the client to continue as a going 
concern for a reasonable period of time (not more than one year) following the financial 
statement date.  If the auditor concludes that the going concern assumption is not reasonable, they 
are responsible to modify their opinion to express such doubt.  The modified opinion is known as 
a going concern audit report (GCAR).  Based on a large sample of audit reports from 2000 to 
2010, Carson et al. (2013) show that 16% of U.S. audit reports are GCARs. 
Current audit guidance (AU-C § 570) provides a framework for the auditor’s decision to issue a 
GCAR.  The framework can be expressed as a two-step process.  The first step requires the  
                                                            
1 AU-C § 570.02 explains that information that contradicts the going concern assumption is that which 
relates to “the entity's inability to continue to meet its obligations as they become due without substantial 
disposition of assets outside the ordinary course of business, restructuring of debt, externally forced 




auditor to assess information obtained through completed audit procedures (i.e. planning and 
field-work).  If this information raises no substantial doubt about the going concern assumption, 
the auditor’s responsibility is complete and they may issue a clean opinion.  If this information 
raises substantial doubt, the auditor continues to the second step.  The second step requires the 
auditor to obtain additional information from management regarding their plans to mitigate any 
conditions that threaten firm viability.  The auditor evaluates this information and, if the doubt is 
alleviated, may issue a clean opinion.  If substantial doubt continues, the auditor is responsible to 
modify their opinion to include an explanatory paragraph expressing this doubt (i.e. issue a 
GCAR).  The auditor is also responsible to communicate their assessment to those charged with 
governance and review the financial statements for appropriate disclosure of conditions that 
threaten firm viability. 
The auditor’s reporting decision is inherently subjective and requires the auditor to exercise 
professional judgment.  Extant audit literature notes that the auditor’s decision is sensitive to two 
types of potential costs (Carson et al. 2013).  If the auditor issues a GCAR, they face the potential 
costs of client dissatisfaction and dismissal.  These costs are only realized if the firm remains 
viable in the subsequent period.  That is, they only occur when the modified opinion is in error 
(i.e. a “False Positive” or “Type 1 Error”).  If the auditor issues a clean opinion, they face the 
potential costs of litigation, censure, and reputation loss.  These potential costs of a clean opinion 
are only realized if the client subsequently fails to remain viable.  That is, they only occur when 
the clean opinion is in error (i.e. a “False Negative” or “Type 2 Error”).  The auditor’s objective 
is to issue an opinion that minimizes the expected costs (Matsumura, Subramanyam, and Tucker 
1997; Tucker et al. 2003).  As such, their reporting decision is sensitive to factors that influence 
the magnitude of the two types of costs as well as information that helps them to predict the 




A robust stream of literature examines the determinants of the auditor’s reporting decision.  
Mutchler (1984) reports the results of audit partner interviews and questionnaires.  She finds that 
auditors consider certain key financial condition metrics to be useful in predicting the firm’s 
future viability.  These metrics include cash flows from operations, the current ratio, firm net 
worth, long-term and total liabilities, and net income.  In a follow-up work, Mutchler (1985) 
examines archival data and reports that these key financial ratios act as strong determinants of the 
audit opinion.  Given the prominent role of these ratios, extant studies investigating the 
determinants of the auditor’s reporting decision commonly include variations of such financial 
ratios as control variables in multivariate models of the reporting decision (Reynolds and Francis 
2001; DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Goh et al. 
2013; Krishnan and Wang 2014). 
In Mutchler’s (1984) survey, audit partners also identify management performance as a 
prominent cue impacting their going concern assessment.  The assessed importance of this cue is 
lower than cash flow projections and mitigating factors, but is higher than the assessed 
importance of management plans, ratio trends, firm age, and firm size.2   Mutchler summarizes 
the following from her discussion with audit partners: 
All respondents stressed the importance of intimate knowledge about 
management.  This intimate knowledge allowed insights to be gained about 
management performance and its impact on the company before any effects 
would be seen through the financial statements.  The respondents did not, 
however, believe that this information would ever be reported as such.  They 
found it difficult to picture a day when specific comments about management 
performance would appear in the audit report or anywhere else in the financial 
statements. 
                                                            
2 In the Mutchler (1984) survey, “Mitigating Factors” are those listed in the AICPA’s SAS No. 34 (1981).  
These broadly refers to asset, debt, cost, and equity factors that mitigate threats to the company’s ability to 
continue as a going concern.  Some specific examples from SAS No. 34 include the “Availability of unused 
lines of credit or similar borrowing capacity” and the “Capability of obtaining additional equity capital.”  
Current audit guidance (AU-C 570) continues to direct auditors to consider mitigating factors but classifies 




Kleinman and Anandarajan (1999) also interview audit partners at a Big Six firm and document 
that intimate knowledge of management is one of the three broad indicators influencing the going 
concern assessment.  However, the authors conclude that this category is “subjective and difficult 
to model” and do not investigate further in their archival analyses of auditor reporting. 
Lennox (2005) and Ye, Carson, and Simnett (2011) examine “alumni” affiliations, where 
financial executives had previously been employed at the engaged audit firm.  These studies 
document evidence that such relationships are negatively associated with the propensity of the 
auditor to issue a modified audit report.  These archival studies and the preceding discussion of 
audit partner interviews demonstrate that the auditor-client relationship is of critical importance to 
the auditor’s going concern reporting decision.  In the following section, I review contemporary 
managerial ability literature and discuss a measurement that is well-suited to investigate the 
relationship between managerial ability and the audit opinion. 
Managerial Ability 
Managerial ability refers to the idiosyncratic impact of management on the firm’s performance.  
It is not immediately clear that variation in managerial ability explains variation in corporate 
operations.  Management’s opportunities to influence the firm’s financial position are constrained 
by a number of governing entities (board of directors, corporate charters, shareholders, 
governments, the IRS, etc…).  One may expect that there is little room for idiosyncratic 
differences in managerial ability to impact the firm.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003) articulate this 
view as follows: “While executives might differ in their preferences, risk-aversion or skill levels, 
none of this translates into actual corporate policies, if a single person cannot easily affect these 
policies.”  Bertrand and Schoar (2003) characterize this expectation as representative of an 
implicit neoclassical view of the firm.  Neoclassical economics focuses on how the firm rationally 




managers are rather interchangeable and that the influence of market conditions will dominate 
over the influence of individual managers. 
Over the past two decades, accounting, management, and finance research has examined whether 
individual executive characteristics have predictable relationships with firm actions.  Some 
prominent studies in accounting and finance include Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Dyreng et al. 
(2010), Bamber et al. (2010), and Ge et al. (2011).  By examining individual managers that 
transition between two separate firms, these studies support the conclusion that individual 
managers and their idiosyncratic differences influence firm policies and practices (e.g. cash 
holdings, tax avoidance, earnings forecasts, and earnings management). 
Building upon these studies, Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) (hereafter DLM) note that 
managerial ability is difficult to quantify in a way that is useful to address many research 
questions.  They note that the previously-mentioned analyses require limited sample sizes in order 
to separate individual manager effects from firm effects.  To address this limitation, they develop 
a new measure of managerial ability based on an input/output view of firm operations.  The DLM 
framework expresses managerial ability as a component of the firm’s ability to efficiently 
transform firm resources (inputs) into revenues (outputs).  In the first stage, the authors use data 
envelopment analysis to measure firm efficiency.  The methodology assigns weights to seven 
corporate resources that are subject to managerial discretion (net PP&E, net operating leases, net 
R&D, purchased goodwill, other intangible assets, cost of inventory, and SG&A) such that the 
firm-specific weights maximize the ratio of revenues to weighted inputs relative to other firms in 
the industry.  This ratio is standardized to a maximum value of one across firms and represents 
their firm efficiency measure.  In the second stage, the authors regress the firm efficiency score 




share, cash availability, life cycle, operational complexity, and foreign operations).  The residuals 
from this estimation are the DLM managerial ability measurement.3  
A number of studies use DLM’s measurement and support its validity as a proxy for managerial 
ability.  In their initial work, DLM find that the measurement is positively associated with the 
effective use of proceeds from equity issuances and positively associated with subsequent firm 
performance.  In a follow-up paper, Demerjian et al. (2013) find that the measurement is 
positively associated with firm earnings quality, including fewer subsequent restatements, higher 
earnings and accruals persistence, lower errors in the bad debt provision, and higher-quality 
accrual estimations.  Baik et al. (2011) note that the measurement is positively associated with the 
likelihood of issuing a management earnings forecast as well as the frequency and accuracy of 
those forecasts.  Andreou et al. (2013) find that the measurement is positively associated with 
firm performance during the 2008 financial crisis.  Wang (2013) uses the DLM measurement and 
reports evidence that managers of high ability time their personal ownership trading activities 
more optimally than managers of low ability.  Most relevant to my work, Krishnan and Wang 
(2014) use the DLM measurement to examine auditor risk assessment.  They document that 
auditors charge lower audit fees and are less likely to issue a GCAR when managerial ability is 
high than when managerial ability is low. 
Prior studies that examine management’s role in financial reporting often use relatively small 
sample sizes and estimate the impact of individual executives on firm financial characteristics 
(Dyreng et al. 2010; Bamber et al. 2010; Ge et al. 2011).4   DLM, by contrast, use a large sample 
                                                            
3 Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) note that larger firms may attract higher-ability manangers and that 
market share may be a function of managerial ability.  Thus, the inclusion of these variables in the second 
stage of their analyses may reduce the variation in firm efficiency that is attributed to managerial ability.  
The authors conclude the following: “We opt to err on the side of attributing manager characteristics to the 
firm, to maximize the likelihood that the residual is largely attributable to the manager.” 
4 These works build their samples based on observable career moves of top managers from one firm to 
another.  This methodology is poorly suited for GCAR analyses because such sampling is constrained to 
larger firms (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Bamber et al. 2010; and Ge et al. 2011 each report that their 




of 177,134 firm-year observations from 1980 to 2009.5   The DLM measurement is designed to 
capture the impact of the whole management team on operational efficiency.  However, DLM and 
Wang (2013) find that the measurement helps to explain the market’s reaction to individual top 
executive transitions and the market’s reaction to the security purchasing behavior of individual 
top executives.  These findings demonstrate that the DLM measurement captures manager quality 
characteristics that are salient to investors.  For the purposes of my analyses, it is not necessary to 
assume that the DLM measurement is descriptive of specific individual executives.  I only 
assume that it is descriptive of the managers that interact with the auditor when the auditor 
assesses the going concern assumption.  In the following section I develop hypotheses for the 
relationships between managerial ability and the auditor’s opinion. 
                                                            
distressed firm-years because the auditor’s reporting decision is most salient when initial doubt about the 
firm’s ability to continue as a going concern is raised.  Descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate that 
distressed sample firm-years tend to be smaller than non-distressed sample firm-years.  As such, I expect 
that applying executive fixed-effects sampling methodology to a sample of distressed firm-years would 
yield a very small sample. 
5 Dr. Peter Demerjian provides updated values for the measurement using 186,499 firm-year observations 









Audit Opinion Accuracy 
As previously discussed, the auditor faces potential costs of client dissatisfaction/dismissal from 
issuing a report that is a Type 1 error (false positive) and faces potential costs of litigation, 
censure, and reputation loss from issuing a report that is a Type 2 error (false negative).  To 
minimize these costs, the auditor strives to form an accurate prediction of the firm’s future 
viability and release an accurate opinion.  When there is initial doubt about the company’s ability 
to continue as a going concern, audit guidance directs the auditor to obtain information regarding 
management’s plans to mitigate any noted threats to the firm’s viability (AU-C § 570.10).  The 
guidance notes that management-prepared prospective information may be a critical component 
of such plans (AU-C § 570.11): 
When prospective financial information is particularly significant to 
management's plans, the auditor should request management to provide that 
information and should consider the adequacy of support for significant 
assumptions underlying that information. The auditor should give particular 
attention to assumptions that are 
• material to the prospective financial information.  
• especially sensitive or susceptible to change.  





The auditor's consideration should be based on knowledge of the entity, its 
business, and its management and should include (a) reading the prospective 
financial information and the underlying assumptions and (b) comparing 
prospective financial information from prior periods with actual results and 
comparing prospective information for the current period with results achieved 
to date. If the auditor becomes aware of factors, the effects of which are not 
reflected in such prospective financial information, the auditor should discuss 
those factors with management and, if necessary, request revision of the 
prospective financial information. 
Prior managerial ability analyses demonstrate a positive relationship between managerial ability 
and the accuracy of prospective information.  Demerjian et al. (2013) document that high 
managerial ability is associated with fewer subsequent restatements, lower errors in the bad debt 
provision, and higher quality accruals estimates.  The authors note that this is consistent with 
high-ability managers being “more knowledgeable about the firm and the industry, as well as 
better able to synthesize information into reliable forward-looking estimates.”  Baik et al. (2011) 
document direct evidence that managerial ability is related to the accuracy of prospective 
information as they estimate a positive relationship between managerial ability and the accuracy 
of management earnings forecasts.  To the extent that this improvement in the accuracy of 
prospective information helps the auditor accurately assess future viability, I posit H1 as a 
directional hypothesis: 
H1: Auditor GCAR reporting is more accurate when managerial ability is high. 
Interaction with Financial Condition Information 
As noted in surveys of audit partners, metrics capturing the firm’s financial condition are critical 
determinants of the auditor’s going concern assessment (Mutchler 1984; Kleinman and 
Anandarajan 1999).  Prior archival analyses document evidence of strong relationships between 
prominent financial condition information and the issuance of a GCAR.  For example, high cash 
and investment holdings signal firm viability and are negatively associated with the issuance of a 




models) signal firm distress and are positively associated with the issuance of a GCAR.6  These 
estimated directional relationships consistently hold in multivariate analyses across the literature 
(Reynolds and Francis 2001; DeFond et al. 2002; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Goh et al. 2013; 
Krishnan and Wang 2014). 
Several experimental studies note that the auditor interacts various pieces of information (i.e. 
configural processing) or prioritizes and utilizes information differently in different 
environments.  Brown and Solomon (1990; 1991), Maletta and Kida (1993), and Hooper and 
Trotman (1996) find that the auditor interacts control presence and strength, the results of audit 
procedures, changes in financial conditions, and internal audit quality as they assess misstatement 
risk and plan audit procedures.  Trotman and Sng (1989) and Rosman et al. (1999) find that the 
auditor-assessed importance of various pieces of information in their GCAR assessment varies 
according to task- and firm-specific conditions, including hypothesis framing, signals in prior 
information, and the firm’s stage of development.  
Bonner (2008) notes that a decision-maker may utilize information in their decision-making 
process using either a compensatory process or noncompensatory process.  Under the 
compensatory process, the decision-maker assigns weights to each piece of information and then 
sums the weighted values to reach a decision.  Under the noncompensatory process, the decision-
maker may ignore certain pieces of information based on the values of other pieces of 
information.  Linear modeling of the GCAR opinion (without interactions) implicitly assumes 
that the auditor uses a compensatory process.  Martens, Bruynseels, Baesens, Willekens, and 
Vanthienen (2008) use advanced data mining analysis to model the auditor’s opinion decision as 
                                                            
6 Note that the construct of bankruptcy score may vary by research design such that high or low values 
capture high or low probability of future bankruptcy.  For example, “PROBANKZ” in Goh et al. (2013) is 
constructed to be positively associated with the probability of bankruptcy, whereas “ALTMAN” in Reichelt 
and Wang (2010) is constructed to be negatively associated with the probability of bankruptcy.  However, 
the estimated directional relationship between these scores and the issuance of a GCAR is consistently 




a decision tree.  While their decision tree largely represents a compensatory process, there are 
instances that reflect a non-compensatory process.  For example, when retained earnings are low 
and net income is negative, they find that variance in the values of other determinants (e.g. size, 
current ratio, liabilities, and working capital) does not impact the opinion.  This demonstrates that 
auditors prioritize and interact information when forming their opinion. 
Archival GCAR studies commonly use linear models of the auditor’s decision and do not 
prominently model interactions of GCAR determinants.7   Some studies examine interactions 
between auditor attributes (e.g. audit firm size and industry specialization) and specific 
determinants or regime changes (Lim and Tan 2008; Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gomez-Aguilar, and 
Carrera 2009; Bruynseels, Knechel, and Willekens 2011; Bruynseels and Willekens 2012; Kaplan 
and Williams 2012; Leone et al. 2013; Myers, Schmidt, and Wilkins 2013).  These studies 
demonstrate that different types of auditors will utilize specific pieces of information and respond 
to environmental conditions differently.  However, very few GCAR studies model interactions 
between GCAR determinants or look at broad changes in the way that the auditor utilizes known 
financial condition determinants.8 
As discussed previously, accounting and finance research demonstrates that management has a 
pervasive impact on firm practices and viability (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; DLM).  As such, I 
posit that managerial ability impacts the environment under which the auditor forms his or her 
                                                            
7 Most archival GCAR analyses use logistic regression to estimate reporting models.  This methodology 
allows for a non-linear relationship between the independent variable(s) and the probability of occurrence 
for the dichotomous dependent variable.  However, this is accomplished by estimating the linear 
relationship between the independent variable(s) and the logit transformation of the probability of 
occurrence.  In summary, while the estimation is non-linear, the model is linear and still assumes a 
compensatory function if interactions are not included in the model. 
8 Two noted studies that include interaction analyses are Leone et al. (2013) and Goh et al. (2013).  Leone 
et al. (2013) examine the interaction of venture capital backing and rush-to-market timing for a sample of 
IPOs.  Goh et al. (2013) estimate the GCAR model under sub-samples separated by time (pre- and post- 
SOX 404 reporting requirements) as part of their additional analyses.  The authors focus on differences in 
the estimated coefficient for their variable of interest (SOX Section 302 reported material weaknesses) and 




opinion and changes the way that the auditor utilizes financial condition information.  Negative 
financial condition information (such as low cash holdings or negative operating cash flows) 
signals conditions of financial distress.  These conditions threaten the firm’s viability by 
constraining management’s ability to operate effectively.  The DLM measurement is specifically 
designed to capture the ability of management to operate efficiently under financial constraints.  
Andreou et al. (2013) use the DLM measurement to examine corporate activities during the 
financial crisis, a period when businesses were broadly constrained by frozen credit markets.  The 
authors document evidence that managers of high ability tend to invest more in new projects 
during the period of financial crisis relative to managers of low ability.  The authors conclude that 
managers of high ability are less constrained by poor economic conditions and thus avoid 
underinvestment problems.   
 If the auditor perceives that managers of higher ability can operate effectively under 
conditions of financial constraint, the financial condition information may be less relevant to the 
auditor’s decision when managers are of higher ability.  I posit H2 as a directional hypothesis: 
H2: The strength of the relationships between observed financial distress indicators and the 
probability that the auditor will issue a GCAR is weaker when managerial ability is high. 
Interaction with Auditor Independence 
A robust stream of literature examines auditor-client negotiation over financial reporting issues 
(Beattie, Fearnley, and Brandt 2004).  McCracken et al. (2008) document two prominent 
classifications of executive-auditor relationships that are based on management’s actions: 
proactive and reactive.  In a proactive relationship, the executive identifies accounting issues and 
promptly consults the auditor with the goal of achieving correct accounting treatment and 
disclosure.  In a reactive relationship, the executive waits to inform the auditor or does not consult 




responsibility.  In the reactive relationship, the executive cedes agency to the auditor and defers to 
the auditor’s interpretation of GAAP compliance. 
Documented relationships between managerial ability and business practices provide evidence 
consistent with the premise that managers of high ability act more proactively than managers of 
low ability.  Managerial ability is positively associated with earnings forecast issuance, positively 
associated with investment activity in a period of financial crisis, and associated with timely 
positioning of personal equity ownership (Baik et al. 2011; Andreou et al. 2013; Wang 2013).  As 
such, it is reasonable to expect that managers of high ability retain agency and bargaining power 
in auditor-client negotiation.  In the context of the audit opinion, such an increase in bargaining 
power causes the client’s threat of auditor dismissal for the issuance of a false positive to be 
stronger when managerial ability is high. 
Auditing regulations and literature warn against inappropriate levels of client influence over the 
auditor.  The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB 2003) standards of ethics 
and independence prohibit members from “knowingly […] subordinating his or her judgment 
when performing professional services.”  Numerous studies on audit quality report evidence of 
varying levels of subordination according to auditor- and engagement-specific characteristics 
(Francis 2004).  In this section, I review relevant proxies for auditor independence and posit 
hypotheses for the moderating role of auditor independence in the previously-documented 
relationship between managerial ability and the auditor’s opinion. 
Auditor Size 
DeAngelo (1981) posits that large auditors (those with a large number of clients) tend to 
withstand client pressure better than small auditors for two reasons.  First, the loss of a single 
client is less significant to a large auditor than a small auditor.  Second, the negative impact of an 




Francis (2004) notes that a number of studies use the Big N/non-Big N distinction to proxy for 
auditor size.  These studies provide rather robust evidence that a Big N auditor is associated with 
higher audit quality than a non-Big N auditor.  Specific to GCAR analysis, Francis and Krishnan 
(1999) and Boone, Khurana, and Raman (2010) find evidence that a Big N auditor is more likely 
to issue a GCAR than a non-Big N auditor.9  This is consistent with a Big N auditor’s ability to 
act more independently than a non-Big N auditor.10  I posit H3-1 as a directional hypothesis:     
H3-1: The negative relationship between managerial ability and the issuance of a GCAR is 
weaker when the auditor is Big N than when the auditor is non-Big N.  
Engagement Economic Significance 
DeAngelo (1981) notes the potential for the auditor to grow dependent on client fees and, in order 
to maintain the engagement, fail to report discovered accounting issues.  Reynolds and Francis 
(2001) and Li (2009) proxy for fee dependence by measuring the client’s size relative to total 
engagements in the auditor’s office.11  They posit that this higher economic significance may 
impair independence and reduce the probability that the auditor will issue a GCAR to a distressed 
company.  Their results do not support a direct relationship between economic significance and 
                                                            
9 Boone et al. (2010) are careful to control for the potential self-selection bias.  This is the risk that noted 
distinctions between auditor types may be due to underlying firm characteristics that determine the auditor 
selection.  The authors follow methodology recommended by Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012) to control 
for this risk.  They perform analyses on a propensity-score matched-pair sample with strict criteria for 
identifying appropriate matches. 
10 This argument is based on auditor independence. An alternative argument can also be expressed focusing 
on auditor technical capability. A Big N auditor may have access to more information (from the other 
clients they audit) than a non-Big N auditor. As such, a Big N auditor’s assessment may be less influenced 
by information provided by management than a non-Big N auditor’s assessment. 
11 Francis (2004) posits that it is valuable to analyze auditor distinctions at the office level for large 
accounting firms because “individual audit engagements are administered by an office based engagement 
partner who is typically located in the same city as the client’s headquarter.”  While an individual client 
may not appear significant at the national level, it may be very significant at the local office level and 
influence auditor behavior.  By way of example, the author notes that Enron represented less than 2% of 





auditor reporting.12   However, it is still valuable to investigate the role of client economic 
significance as a moderating variable in the relationship between managerial ability and the 
auditor’s opinion. I posit H3-2 as a directional hypothesis:  
H3-2: The negative relationship between managerial ability and the issuance of a GCAR is 
stronger when the economic significance of the client to the auditor is high than when economic 
significance is low.  
Industry Specialization 
Another prominent auditor characteristic is the audit firm’s level of industry specialization.  The 
auditor gains industry specialization primarily through direct industry-specific engagement 
experiences (Solomon, Shields, and Whittington 1999).  These experiences contribute to an 
industry-specific knowledge base that the auditor is able to apply in practice.  Francis (2004) 
notes that extant accounting research provides robust evidence that industry specialization is 
positively associated with audit quality.  Specific to GCAR analysis, Reichelt and Wang (2010) 
document evidence that industry specialist auditors are more likely to issue a GCAR than non-
industry specialist auditors.  The authors note that this conservative reporting is consistent with an 
industry-specialist auditor’s added incentive to protect their reputation within their primary 
industry.  Given this evidence that an industry specialist auditor acts more independently than a 
non-industry specialist auditor, I posit H3-3 as a directional hypothesis:    
                                                            
12 Reynolds and Francis (2001) and Li (2009) actually detect a positive relationship between fee 
significance and the propensity to issue a GCAR.  Reynolds and Francis (2001) acknowledge that it is 
possible that their proxies and models contain measurement error and/or misspecification.  Reynolds and 
Francis (2001) and Li (2009) also posit that the costs of an incorrect clean opinion (litigation, censure, and 
reputation loss) are higher for large clients, leading to more conservative reporting.  Reynolds and Francis 





H3-3: The negative relationship between managerial ability and the issuance of a GCAR is 
weaker when the auditor is an industry specialist than when the auditor is not an industry 
specialist.  
Auditor Tenure 
Prior research investigates the impact of auditor tenure on audit quality.  Legislators and standard 
setters express concern that auditor independence may be impaired as tenure increases because 
the auditor becomes more captive to clients.  As a counter-argument, many expect that years of 
client-specific experience contributes to a client-specific knowledge base that improves audit 
quality.  Francis (2004) reviews empirical studies on the relationship between auditor tenure and 
financial reporting quality (as a proxy for audit quality) and notes that research largely provides 
evidence that long tenure either improves or has minimal impact on financial reporting quality.    
Evidence regarding the relationship between auditor tenure and the issuance of a GCAR is 
somewhat mixed.  In studies that include auditor tenure as a control variable in large-sample 
analyses (where the majority of firm-year observations remain viable in the subsequent period) 
the estimated direction of the coefficient for tenure varies from study to study (Boone et al. 2010; 
Reichelt and Wang 2010; Gramling, Krishnan, and Zhang 2011; Kaplan and Williams 2012).  
However, Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) estimate a positive relationship between tenure and 
the issuance of a GCAR when using a sample of only firm-years that subsequently file for 
bankruptcy.  Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) also estimate a positive (though not statistically 
significant) coefficient for tenure in a sample of firms that subsequently fail and estimate a strong 




support the premise that long tenure improves the ability of the auditor to evaluate the firm’s 
financial condition.13  As such, I posit H3-4 as a directional hypothesis:  
H3-4: The negative relationship between managerial ability and the issuance of a GCAR is 
weaker when auditor tenure is long than when audit tenure is short. 
 
                                                            
13 Note that this discussion is specific to audit firm tenure, not audit partner tenure.  Carey and Simnett 
(2006) examine a sample of Australian reporting firms and document evidence that audit partner tenure is 
negatively associated with the propensity of the audit firm to issue a GCAR.  Data for audit partner tenure 
is not publically available for observations in this paper’s sample.  As such, the relationship between 







METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLING 
 
Estimation Models 
To test the relationship between managerial ability and the auditor’s going concern reporting 
decision, I begin with the following multivariate model of the probability that the auditor will 
issue a GCAR as a function of firm and auditor characteristics: 
 
The dependent variable, GCAR, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the auditor issues a going 
concern modified audit report; 0 otherwise.  The first independent variable, MGRL ABILITY, is 
the measurement of managerial ability developed by Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012).  The 
next seven variables in the model are proxies for the firm’s financial condition.  These include 
characteristics prominently identified as determinants of the auditor’s reporting decision in 
archival GCAR analyses (Goh et al. 2013; Krishnan and Wang 2014).  SIZE (the natural 





assets at year-end), LEV (total liabilities scaled by total assets at year-end), and CLEV (the change 
in LEV from the prior to the current period) capture key elements of the firm’s balance sheet 
position.  LOSS (an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm experiences negative operating 
income after depreciation, 0 otherwise) and OCF (operating cash flows scaled by total liabilities 
at year-end) capture key elements of the firm’s operations.  ZSCORE is a variable based on 
Altman’s (1968) bankruptcy score and captures variation in the probability of subsequent 
bankruptcy based on various balance sheet, income statement, and market pricing metrics (see 
definition in Table 1 for further details). 
Of the seven financial condition variables, three are signed such that a higher value is consistent 
with firm viability (SIZE, CASH, and OCF) while the others are signed such that a higher value is 
consistent with firm distress.  For ease of interpretation of results in the upcoming interacted 
model, I transform these three variables in my multivariate analyses so that the expected direction 
of the estimated coefficients are consistent with firm distress across the financial condition 
variables.  I multiply the values for each of these variables by negative one and label the 
transformed versions as NEG SIZE, NEG CASH, and NEG OCF. 
The next four variables in the model are proxies for auditor independence.  These include BIGN 
(an indicator variable that equals 1 if a big 4 auditor performs the audit, 0 otherwise), 
SIGNIFICANCE (the company’s total fees paid to the auditor scaled by the total revenue of the 
auditor’s local office for the reported fiscal year), SPECIALIST (an indicator variable that equals 
1 if the audit firm is an industry specialist at both the national and local level, 0 otherwise), and 
TENURE (the length of consecutive years that the auditor has been engaged to provide the firm’s 
audit).  SPECIALIST is calculated following Reichelt and Wang’s (2010) assertion that national 
and local industry specialization jointly determine audit quality (see definition in Table 1 for 
further details).  Based on relationships documented in prior literature, BIGN, SIGNIFICANCE, 




a GCAR.  Prior literature does not demonstrate a consistent directional relationship between 
TENURE and the issuance of a GCAR. 
I include REPORT LAG (the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the signature date of 
the audit opinion) and the lagged value of GCAR in the model.  These are commonly-used control 
variables in going concern analyses, though they do not serve as clear proxies for the firm’s 
financial condition.  I also include year indicator variables and industry indicator variables 
identified according to Fama and French’s (1997) 48 industry classifications.  Table 1 lists the 
variables and provides details about their calculation. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
In order to test H1, I estimate Model (1) using two separate sub-samples.  My sample of firm-
years is split between those where the firm remains viable in the twelve months following the 
financial statement date and firm-years where the firm files for bankruptcy in the twelve months 
following the financial statement date.  This methodology is a common way of testing auditor 
reporting by error type (Geiger and Rama 2006; Myers et al. 2013).14  In the sub-sample of firm-
years that subsequently files for bankruptcy, I include BANKRUPTCY LAG (the number of days 
between the audit report filing date and the bankruptcy filing date) as an extra explanatory 
variable.  H1 predicts that managerial ability is associated with GCAR reporting accuracy.  For 
firm-years where the firm subsequently remains viable, an estimated negative coefficient for 
                                                            
14 A Type 1 error occurs when the auditor issues a GCAR and the firm subsequently remains viable.  A 
Type 2 error occurs when the auditor issues a clean opinion and the firm subsequently fails.  Consistent 
with prior literature, I use an identified bankruptcy filing as my proxy for firm failure.  Lennox (1999) 
notes the possibility that events causing bankruptcy are truly not predictable when the auditor makes their 
opinion assessment.  In other words, researchers may classify clean audit opinions as Type 2 errors even 
though the clean opinion was appropriate at the time it was released.  Lennox (1999) concludes that 





MGRL ABILITY is consistent with H1.  For firm-years where the firm subsequently fails, an 
estimated positive coefficient for MGRL ABILITY is consistent with H1. 
In order to test H2, I modify Model (1) to include interactions between MGRL ABILITY and the 
seven financial condition variables: 
 
As noted previously, the financial condition variables are all signed such that a higher value is 
consistent with firm distress.  As such, I expect that the estimated coefficients for each of these 
main effects are positive when estimating both Model (1) and Model (2).  H2 predicts that the 
estimated coefficients for the interaction terms in Model (2) are negative (i.e. the opposite of the 
estimated coefficients for the financial condition variable main effects). 
In order to test H3-1 through H3-4, I modify Model (1) to include interactions between MGRL 






These hypotheses predict that the negative relationship between managerial ability and the 
issuance of a GCAR is weaker when the auditor is Big N, when economic significance is low, 
when the auditor is an industry specialist, and when tenure is long.  Since the relationship 
between managerial ability and the issuance of a GCAR is demonstrated to be negative, the 
hypotheses predict that the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms between MGRL 
ABILITY and BIGN, SIGNIFICANCE, SPECIALIZATION, and TENURE are positive, negative, 
positive, and positive respectively.   
Sampling 
Data for my analyses come from multiple sources.  I obtain data for the MGRL ABILITY variable 
from Dr. Peter R. Demerjian’s web-site.15  The dataset contains values for firm-years from 1980 
through 2011.  Geiger, Raghunandan, and Rama (2005) and Myers et al. (2013) document 
evidence that auditors are more likely to issue GCARs after the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX).16  While SOX does not specifically address GCARs, the authors of these studies conclude 
that the change in GCAR reporting is due to the overall increased scrutiny of the audit profession 
                                                            
15 Data available for download at https://community.bus.emory.edu/personal/PDEMERJ/Pages/Download-
Data.aspx 






following the financial reporting and auditing failures of the early 2000’s.  Therefore, I restrict 
my sample to post-SOX observations from fiscal year 2002 through 2011.  Data for the GCAR 
variable and various auditor variables come from Audit Analytics.  Financial statement variables 
are constructed based on data from Compustat.  I identify firm bankruptcies using the UCLA 
LoPucki Bankruptcy database, Mergent FISD, and Bloomberg.  I obtain data from prior to 2002 
to calculate variables that require lagged observations.  I drop financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), 
very small firms (total assets less than $500k), firm-years where the audit report filing date is 
subsequent to an identified bankruptcy filing date, and firm-years that have a public debt issuance 
in default.  The full sample contains 30,417 observations with data for all necessary variables. 
Studies that examine GCARs frequently restrict the sample to financially distressed firms 
(Raghunandan and Rama 1995; Reynolds and Francis 2001; DeFond et al. 2002; Gramling et al. 
2011; Bruynseels et al. 2011; Bruynseels and Willekens 2012; Myers et al. 2013).  Reynolds and 
Francis (2001) explain that this is done to focus on a sample of firms “for which the going 
concern report is a more salient decision.”  I follow DeFond et al. (2002) and classify firm-years 
as financially distressed if either reported operating earnings or reported operating cash flows are 
negative for the firm-year.  From the full sample, 11,453 firm-years meet this definition of 
distress.17 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample in the first column.   
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
The second and third columns report descriptive statistics for non-distressed and distressed sub-
samples respectively. The final column reports differences in mean values between the non-
distressed and distressed sub-samples. Consistent with the classification criteria, distressed firm-
                                                            
17 This sample size is comparable to the 11,257 financially distressed firm-year observations used for the 




years have lower operating cash flows and are more likely to have incurred a loss than non-
distressed firm-years. Distressed firm-years are more likely to receive a GCAR, are smaller, have 
higher leverage, and have higher predicted probabilities of bankruptcy (ZSCORE).   
The descriptive statistics show that the mean value of MGRL ABILITY is higher for non-
distressed firm-years (0.016) than distressed firm-years (-0.058).  Figure 1 shows the distribution 
of MGRL ABILITY under the two sub-samples visually. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
The reported standard deviations in Table 2 and visual inspection of the distributions at Figure 1 
show that there is significant variance in MGRL ABILITY among both distressed and non-
distressed firm-years.    
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlations for the sample.   
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
The first column documents the correlations between the independent variables and the issuance 
of a GCAR.  Univariate correlations show that the variable of interest, MGRL ABILITY, is 
negatively related to the issuance of a GCAR.  The variables reflecting the financial condition of 
the company are correlated with GCAR in predictable ways, with negative correlations measured 
for SIZE, CASH, and OCF and positive correlations measured for LEV, CLEV, LOSS, and 
ZSCORE.  The univariate correlations between the auditor characteristics variables and GCAR are 
not all consistent with the theoretical relationships predicted in section III.  For example, Table 3 
notes negative correlations for BIGN and SPECIALIST.  However, these two variables are 
positively correlated with SIZE, a known negative determinant of GCAR.  This underscores the 
importance of multivariate analysis to estimate the marginal effect of auditor size on the 




SIGNIFICANCE.  While this is not consistent with the theoretical prediction that economic 
significance may impair auditor independence, it is consistent with the directional relationship 
documented by Reynolds and Francis (2001) and Li (2009).  The correlation between GCARt-1 







RESULTS OF MAIN ANLYSES 
 
Audit Opinion Accuracy 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients for Model (1) and the results of the test of H1.   
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
The first column of Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients for Model (1) using the full 
sample of distressed firm-years.  This serves as a baseline model.  The estimated coefficient for 
MGRL ABILITY is negative, consistent with Krishnan and Wang (2014).  The estimated 
coefficients for each of the seven financial condition variables (NEG SIZE through ZSCORE) are 
positive, consistent with the variables’ constructs that higher values reflect distressed financial 
conditions.  The estimated fit statistic of the model and sample is a Pseudo-R2 of 41.9%.  By way 
of comparison, the Pseudo-R2 of the estimated models in DeFond et al. (2002) range from 40% to 
41%.   
The second (third) column of Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients for Model (1) using the 
sub-sample of distressed firm-years where the firm remains viable (files for bankruptcy) in the 
twelve months following the firm-year financial statement date.  Of the 11,453 distressed firm-
years, 147 file for bankruptcy in the twelve months following the financial statement date.  H1 




where the firm subsequently remains viable, an estimated negative coefficient for MGRL 
ABILITY is consistent with H1.  For firm-years where the firm subsequently fails, an estimated 
positive coefficient for MGRL ABILITY is consistent with H1.  Table 4 documents that the 
estimated coefficient for MGRL ABILITY is negative in both sub-samples.  As such, the results 
demonstrate that higher managerial ability is simultaneously associated with a decrease in false 
positives (Type 1 errors) and an increase in false negatives (Type 2 errors). 
The relationship between managerial ability and reporting accuracy is subject to the reader’s 
perspective.  It is true that a clean opinion is an accurate opinion for the vast majority of audit 
reports.  From this perspective the negative estimated coefficient in the sample of firm-years that 
subsequently remain viable demonstrates that managerial ability is positively associated with 
reporting accuracy.  However, I prefer to make conclusions on the determinants of reporting 
accuracy based on the relationships in both samples, following the practice of Lennox (1999), 
Geiger and Rama (2006), and Myers et al. (2013).  From this perspective, I conclude that the 
documented relationships do not provide convincing evidence that managerial ability is 
associated with improved auditor reporting accuracy.  Rather, the documented relationships are 
consistent with managerial ability strictly influencing the auditor towards a clean opinion, 
regardless of the subsequent viability of the firm. 
These documented relationships contribute to the discussion of audit reporting errors. Descriptive 
statistics in Carson et al. (2013) show that the auditor frequently issues a GCAR to a company 
that does not file for bankruptcy in the subsequent twelve months (Type 1 errors).  In fact, their 
work documents that, from 2000 to 2010, Type 1 errors outnumber correctly-issued GCARs by a 
ratio of 58 to 1.  The Center for Audit Quality identifies the high number of false positives as a 
key area of concern for the auditing profession (CAQ 2012).  Such conservative reporting 
suggests that the auditor’s expected costs of litigation, censure, and reputation loss for a Type 2 




(Hopwood et al. 1994, Tucker et al. 2003).18  Documented results demonstrate that high 
managerial ability influences the auditor to report less conservatively.  However, this relationship 
holds even when conservative reporting is desirable.  As such, the implications of the relationship 
between managerial ability and the issuance of a GCAR are subject to the reader’s sensitivity to 
the cost of Type 1 errors versus the cost of Type 2 errors. 
Interaction with Financial Condition Information 
Table 5 reports estimated coefficients for Model (2) and the results of the test of H2.   
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
The first column presents the estimated coefficients for the main effects of each variable in Model 
(2).  As expected, the estimated coefficients for the main effects of the seven financial condition 
variables (NEG SIZE through ZSCORE) are positive and statistically significant.  The next 
column presents the estimated coefficients for interactions between MGRL ABILITY and the 
corresponding financial condition variables.  For six of the seven interactions, the estimated 
coefficients are negative.  The negative estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 
traditional levels for four of these interactions – MGRL ABILITY interacted with NEG CASH, 
LEV, NEG OCF, and ZSCORE.19 
The estimated coefficients for three of the seven interactions are not statistically significant at the 
traditional levels – MGRL ABILITY interacted with NEG SIZE, CLEV, and LOSS.  The interaction 
                                                            
18 There are a number of documented instances where auditors incur litigation costs due to Type 2 errors.  
In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a $119.9 million jury verdict and a 
$182.9 million judgment against PricewaterhouseCoopers for failing to issue a GCAR.  KPMG is currently 
faces litigation regarding twelve clean opinions issued for New Century.  See Carcello and Palmrose (1994) 
and Kaplan and Williams (2012) for further discussion of litigation on Type 2 errors.  However, we know 
of no documented instances where auditors incur litigation costs due to Type 1 errors. 
19 As an alternate variable specification, I construct the ZSCORE variable based on Zmijewski’s (1984) 
bankruptcy probability model.  The interaction between MGRL ABILITY and ZSCORE is not statistically 




with NEG SIZE may not be statistically significant because firm size captures a number of aspects 
of the company, including client bargaining power with the auditor (Goh et al. 2013).  The 
interaction with CLEV may not be statistically significant because CLEV is positively correlated 
with LEV (0.27 correlation reported at Table 3).  In un-tabulated analyses, I remove LEV and its 
interaction with MGRL ABILITY from Model (2).  In this alternate model form, the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction between MGRL ABILITY and CLEV is negative and statistically 
significant at 0.05.  The interaction with LOSS may not be statistically because the sampling 
methodology limits variation for this variable.  Consistent with prior literature, I classify a firm-
year as distressed if the firm reports either a loss or negative operating cash flows in that year.  In 
the sample of distressed firm-years, LOSS equals 1 for 86.7% of the observations.  While the 
estimated coefficient for the main effect of LOSS is statistically significant, there may not be 
enough observations where LOSS equals 0 to estimate a statistically significant negative 
coefficient for the interaction term.  
The estimated coefficients of interaction terms must be interpreted very carefully when using 
logistic regression.  Hoetker (2007) explains that “Unlike OLS, the marginal effect of an 
interaction between two variables in a logit model is not simply the coefficient of their 
interaction.”  Instead, the marginal effect is a function of the coefficient for the interaction, the 
coefficients for each interacted variable, and the values of all variables.  Both the sign and 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficient for the interaction may not accurately reflect 
the marginal effect across all values of the two variables (Ai and Norton 2003; Hoetker 2007).  
Hoetker (2007) recommends graphical analysis of the relationship for correct interpretation.  
Following this best practice, Figure 2 presents contour plots of the predicted probability of the 
issuance of a GCAR across the range of values for the two interacted variables.20 
                                                            
20 The predicted probabilities are based on variation in the two interacted variables only.  All other 




 [Insert Figure 2 Here] 
In each plot the financial condition variable appears on the Y-Axis and MGRL ABILITY appears 
on the X-Axis.  To interpret these plots, first remember that the financial condition variables are 
each signed so that higher values are consistent with firm distress.  As such, I expect the predicted 
probability curves to increase along the Y-Axis.  Each plot is consistent with this expectation.  
Next, consider the plot of the interaction between NEG SIZE and MGRL ABILITY.  The estimated 
coefficient of the interaction between these two variables in Table 5 is not statistically significant.  
The plot of the interaction reveals that the marginal increase in PR(GCAR = 1) for a unit increase 
in NEG SIZE (along the Y-Axis) is approximately constant across the range of values for MGRL 
ABILITY (along the X-Axis).  This is consistent with no interaction effect and validates the 
estimated coefficients and p-values in Table 5.  A similar pattern is noted for the interaction with 
LOSS, consistent with the results reported in Table 5. 
Now consider the plot of the interaction between NEG CASH and MGRL ABILITY.  The 
estimated negative coefficient for this interaction in Table 5 is negative and statistically 
significant.  The plot reveals that, at the low end of MGRL ABILITY, low cash and investments 
can increase PR(GCAR = 1) from below 2.5% to above 12.5%.  However, at the high end of 
MGRL ABILITY, low cash and investments can only increase PR(GCAR = 1) between the range 
of 5% and 7.5%.  This clearly demonstrates the moderating effect of managerial ability posited in 
H2 and emphasizes the practical significance of the interaction effect.  Similar patterns in the 
probability curves are noted for interactions with LEV, CLEV, NEG OCF, and ZSCORE.  The 
plotted interaction between MGRL ABILITY and CLEV suggests that the interaction effect, though 
not statistically significant at traditional levels (Table 5), is very practically significant as a 
determinant of the probability that the auditor will issue a GCAR.  In summary, the estimated 




They demonstrate that managerial ability moderates the sensitivity of the auditor’s opinion to 
prominently-identified financial conditions. 
The results demonstrate the importance of modeling interactions among variables when 
examining auditor reporting.  Theoretical and experimental studies prominently demonstrate that 
the auditor interacts information, prioritizes information, and utilizes information differently 
under different environmental conditions (Brown and Solomon 1990; Rosman et al. 1999; Bonner 
2008).  However, archival analyses of the auditor rarely interact determinants of the audit opinion 
and do not document circumstances in which the auditor changes their use of the most prominent 
indicators of financial distress (i.e. constrained cash and high leverage).  The results of my study 
demonstrate that the auditor’s use of these prominent indicators of financial distress varies 
according the level of managerial ability that exists within the firm.  This provides additional 
insight into the negative relationship between managerial ability and the issuance of a GCAR 
documented by Krishnan and Wang (2014). 
Interaction with Auditor Independence 
Table 6 reports estimated coefficients for Model (3) and the results of the tests of H3-1 through 
H3-4. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
The estimated coefficients for the interaction terms are presented to the right of the estimated 
coefficients for the auditor characteristics variables.  None of the estimated coefficients for the 
interaction terms are statistically significant at traditional levels.  Reviewing the graphical 
presentation of the predicted probability of receiving a going concern opinion across the 
interacted variables does not demonstrate any practical significance of the interaction effect (un-




It is worth noting that there are confounding effects related to many of the auditor independence 
variables.  For example, H3-1 predicts that BIGN moderates the auditor’s sensitivity to MGRL 
ABILITY because large auditors are more sensitive to the reputation damage from a single client 
reporting failure than they are to the lost revenue from a single dissatisfied client.  However, it is 
also possible that the opinions of large auditors are more sensitive to managerial ability (relative 
to small auditors) because their ability to withstand litigation allows them to utilize non-financial 
cues in their opinion formation.  H3-2 predicts that the negative relationship between MGRL 
ABILITY and the auditor’s opinion is strongest when SIGNIFICANCE is high because of the 
potential for fee dependence to impair auditor independence.  However, Reynolds and Francis 
(2001) and Li (2009) note that the metric is confounded by client profile which increases the 
auditor’s sensitivity to Type 2 errors and influences them to report more conservatively.  H3-4 
predicts that TENURE moderates the sensitivity to MGRL ABILITY because the client-specific 
knowledge base of a long-tenure auditor enables them to act more independently.  However, it is 
also possible that the opinions of long-tenure auditors are more sensitive to managerial ability 
(relative to short-tenure auditors) because the auditor requires a certain length of tenure in order 
to even evaluate management’s ability.  In summary, the lack of results for H3-1 through H3-4 









Alternate Variable Specification 
Lagged and Rolling Managerial Ability 
Certain financial statement variables (sales, COGS, SG&A, PPE, R&D, Goodwill, and Other 
Intangible Assets) simultaneously impact the DLM managerial ability measurement and the 
model’s control variables.  This simultaneity suggests an endogeneity concern.  To investigate 
further, I use one-year lagged values of MGRL ABILITY as well as a rolling three-year average of 
MGRL ABILITY.  These values should be more exogenous to the auditor’s current-period 
reporting decision.   
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Table 7 reproduces the analyses at Table 4 using these alternate specifications.  For the sample of 
firms that remain viable in the subsequent period, the estimated coefficient for MGRL ABILITY is 
negative and statistically significant using both alternate specifications.  For the sub-sample of 
firms that file for bankruptcy in the subsequent period, the estimated coefficient for MGRL 
ABILITY is negative but only statistically significant using the three-year rolling average.  In 




managerial ability influences the auditor towards a clean opinion regardless of subsequent 
viability. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Table 8 reproduces the analyses in Table 5 using these alternate specifications.  Using these 
alternate specifications, the estimated coefficients are largely consistent with those reported in 
Table 5.  The estimated coefficients of the interactions between MGRL ABILITY and NEG OCF 
are not statistically significant.  However, the estimated negative coefficients for the interactions 
between MGRL ABILITY and CLEV are now statistically significant at traditional levels.  Visual 
inspection of the PR(GCAR = 1) as a function of the interacted variables using alternate 
specifications (un-tabulated) is consistent with the plots reported at Figure 2.  In summary, 
analyses using these alternate specifications provides support for H2. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
Table 9 reproduces the analyses in Table 6 using these alternate specifications.  Using these 
alternate specifications, the estimated coefficients are largely consistent with those reported at 
Table 6.  However, the estimated coefficient for the interaction between MGRL ABILITY and 
SIGNIFICANCE is negative and statistically significant when using the lagged value of MGRL 
ABILITY.  This provides some support for H3-2, demonstrating that the negative relationship 
between MGRL ABILITY and the issuance of a GCAR is strongest when SIGNIFICANCE is high.  
Visual inspection of the PR(GCAR = 1) as a function of the interacted variables using alternate 
specifications (un-tabulated) supports the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients 




Factor Analysis of Financial Condition Variables 
The financial condition variables are highly interrelated.  For example, total assets impacts SIZE, 
CASH, LEV, CLEV, and ZSCORE.  Revenues impacts LOSS, OCF, and ZSCORE.  It is valuable 
to consider the impact of these interrelations on my analyses.  I perform exploratory principal 
component analyses to estimate the underlying factors of these financial condition variables.  This 
methodology is consistent with archival corporate governance analyses which attempt to discern 
the underlying factors that drive the multitude of corporate governance variables (Larcker, 
Richardson, and Tuna 2007; Dey 2008; Hossain, Mitra, Rezaee, and Sarath 2011). 
[Insert Table 10 – Panel A Here] 
Table 10 – Panel A reports the estimated factors of the seven variables.  The first three factors 
each have eigenvalues greater than unity.  However, their cumulative proportion of variance 
explains only totals 63.1%.  Five factors are necessary in order to exceed 80% of total variance 
explained.  As such, this demonstrates that there is not serious multicollinearity among the 
financial condition variables.  I create variables based on the first three factors and modify 
Models (1) and (2) to include these factors rather than the financial condition variables.  Table 10 
– Panel A reports the factor loadings to create these factors as functions of the financial condition 
variables. 
[Insert Table 10 – Panel B Here] 
Table 10 – Panel B reports the estimated coefficients for Models (1) and (2) using the three 
factors as alternate variables.  The three factors all serve as statistically significant determinants 




interactions between MGRL ABILITY and the factors are statistically significant for two of the 
three factors.  It is important to note that the factors are not signed such that higher values are 
consistent with financial distress.21  Rather, they are non-directional measurements of the shared 
variance of the financial condition variables.  The estimated coefficients for the interaction terms 
hold the opposite signs of the estimated coefficients for the main effects of the factors.  This 
supports the moderating role of MGRL ABILITY expressed in H2, but does not directly test H2 
because it cannot demonstrate a baseline relationship between distressed financial conditions and 
the issuance of a GCAR.  This baseline relationship must be assumed, but is reasonable given the 
consistent directional relationships demonstrated in prior literature and in the analyses in Tables 
4, 5, and 6. 
Alternate Model Specification 
Audit Fees 
Krishnan and Wang (2014) document that managerial ability is negatively associated with the 
likelihood that the auditor will issue a GCAR and negatively associated with audit fees.  They 
conclude that these relationships are consistent with a negative relationship between managerial 
ability and auditor-assessed business risk (i.e. the risk of subsequent poor firm performance and 
failure) and risk of material misstatement.  While audit fees are rarely included as explanatory 
variables in GCAR models, two prominent studies do examine their role as determinants.  
DeFond et al. (2002) and Geiger and Rama (2003) each examine non-audit service fees and total 
                                                            
21 This is especially true for FACTOR3.  Table 10 – Panel A reports that FACTOR3 is a negative function 




audit fees as factors that may impair auditor independence.22  Each of these studies reports no 
significant association between non-audit service fees and the issuance of a GCAR.  However, 
Geiger and Rama (2003) do document a positive association between audit fees and the issuance 
of a GCAR.   As such, audit fees may represent an omitted independent variable correlated with 
MGRL ABILITY.  I modify models (1) and (2) to include LAUDIT (the natural logarithm of audit 
fees) and re-perform my analyses. 
[Insert Table 11 – Panel A Here] 
Table 11 – Panel A presents the estimation of Model (1) with LAUDIT included.  The first 
column presents the baseline analysis using all distressed firm-years.  The estimated coefficient 
for LAUDIT is positive and statistically significant, consistent with Geiger and Rama (2003).  The 
estimated coefficient for MGRL ABILITY is negative and statistically significant.  The second and 
third columns present the estimation of Model (1) on sub-samples of firms that remain viable and 
file for bankruptcy (respectively).  The estimated coefficient for MGRL ABILITY is negative and 
statistically significant in both sub-samples, consistent with the results reported in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 11 – Panel B Here] 
Table 11 – Panel B presents the estimation of Model (2) with LAUDIT included.  The estimated 
coefficient for LAUDIT is positive and statistically significant.  The estimated coefficients for the 
                                                            
22 The variables of interest in DeFond et al. (2002) include non-audit service fees at the client level scaled 
by total fees at the client level and the sum of audit and non-audit fees with no scaling.  The variables of 
interest in Geiger and Rama (2003) include audit fees and non-audit services fees, each without scaling.  
My models include.  SIGNIFICANCE, calculated as total fees at the client level scaled by total fees at the 
auditor office level.  All of these variables are designed to capture the auditor’s economic dependence on 




interaction terms are consistent with those reported in Table 5, supporting H2.  In summary, the 
results of my analyses are robust to the inclusion of audit fees in the model.   
[Insert Table 11 – Panel C Here] 
Table 11 – Panel C presents the estimation of Model (3) with LAUDIT included.  The estimated 
coefficient for LAUDIT is positive and statistically significant.  The estimated coefficients for the 
interaction terms are consistent with those reported in Table 6, providing no support for H3-1 
through H3-4.   
Combine Models (2) and (3) 
Model (2) includes interactions between MGRL ABILITY and the seven financial condition 
variables, while Model (3) includes interactions between MGRL ABILITY and the four auditor 
independence variables.  As an alternate specification, I include all of these interactions in the 
same model. 
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
Table 12 reports the results of the estimation.  The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms 
are consistent with those reported at Tables 5 and 6.  
Additional Analysis of Auditor Independence Hypotheses 
As noted in Table 6, the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms between MGRL ABILITY 
and the four auditor independence variables are not statistically significant at traditional levels 




auditor independence variables.  For example, the correlations between BIGN and 
SIGNIFICANCE, SPECIALIST, and TENURE are -.389, .268, and .243 respectively.  It is 
possible that multicollinearity is too strong to properly detect the moderating role of auditor 
independence using a fully-interacted model.  As an alternate specification, I re-estimate Model 
(3) four times.  Each time I include only one of the auditor independence variables and its 
interaction with MGRL ABILITY.  I note no statistically significant estimated coefficients for the 
interaction terms (un-tabulated).  I also estimate models with SIGNIFICANCE, SPECIALIST, and 
TENURE (including their interactions with MGRL ABILITY) separately under samples where 
BIGN=1 and BIGN=0.  I still note no statistically significant estimated coefficients for the 
interaction terms (untabulated).   
Alternate Sampling 
Expanded Definition of Subsequent Firm Failure 
To test H1, I examine a sub-sample of firms that file for bankruptcy in the subsequent period.  
This serves as my proxy for the firm’s failure to remain viable and continue operations in future 
periods without significant intervention.  However, this sample is very small (147 observations 
reported at Table 4).  In order to improve my analysis of Type 2 errors, I expand the definition of 
subsequent firm failure to include securities that are delisted in the subsequent period due to 
liquidation or other reasons that indicate firm failure.23 
                                                            
23 I utilize the delisting code (DLSTCD) in CRSP to identify these instances.  I include those that delist due 
to liquidation (DLSTCD 400-490, 572), due to lack of compliance with exchange requirements (DLSTCD 




[Insert Table 13 Here] 
Table 13 reproduces the analyses at Table 4 using these alternate sampling specifications.  The 
sample of firms that subsequently fail using this alternate specification expands to 244 
observations.  The estimated coefficient for MGRL ABILITY is negative and statistically 
significant in both sub-samples.  This alternate sampling specification confirms the conclusion 
that managerial ability influences the auditor to issue a clean opinion regardless of the subsequent 











Motivated by extant archival and experimental literature, my research examines the dynamic role 
of managerial ability in the auditor’s reporting decision.  I posit that high managerial ability 
improves the accuracy of the auditor’s opinion through improved accuracy of the prospective 
information available to the auditor.  The results of my analyses demonstrate that the negative 
relationship between managerial ability and the issuance of a GCAR holds regardless of the ex-
post realized viability of the firm.  As such, managerial ability is simultaneously associated with a 
decrease in Type 1 reporting errors and an increase in Type 2 reporting errors.  I also posit that 
managerial ability impacts the auditor’s assessment by changing the way that the auditor utilizes 
the company’s financial condition information.  The results of my analyses demonstrate that the 
auditor is less sensitive to prominent indicators of financial distress when managerial ability is 
high than when managerial ability is low.  Finally, I posit that auditor independence may 
moderate the negative relationship between managerial ability and the issuance of a going 
concern.  The results of my analyses do not support such an effect. 
My work contributes to the discussion of audit reporting errors.  Auditors desire to issue an 
accurate audit opinion but tend to report overly-conservatively (Carson et al. 2013; CAQ 2012).  




conservatively, even when conservative reporting is desirable.  As such, the implications of the 
relationship between managerial ability and the issuance of a modified opinion are subject to the 
reader’s sensitivity to false positives versus false negatives.  My work motivates future research 
that examines the costs of false positives and false negatives to firms, managers, auditors, and 
debt and equity market participants. 
My first hypothesis predicts that managerial ability improves the auditor’s ability to issue a 
GCAR to firms that fail in the subsequent period.  My results document the opposite of this 
expected relationship.  The expectation is based on the positive relationship between managerial 
ability and the accuracy of prospective information documented by Demerjian et al. (2013) and 
Baik et al. (2011).  However, these studies do not directly examine the relationship between 
managerial ability and the accuracy of prospective information by information type – good news 
versus bad news.  It is possible that the documented relationship only holds for good news and 
does not hold (or is even negative) for bad news.  My work motivates analysis of the relationships 
between managerial ability and the bias of prospective information or the accuracy of prospective 
information by type.  Such analyses would assist auditors as they assess and utilize management-
prepared prospective information. 
My work primarily contributes to extant archival literature that examines the determinants of the 
audit opinion.  Theoretical and experimental studies prominently demonstrate that the auditor 
interacts information, prioritizes information, and utilizes information differently under different 
environmental conditions (Brown and Solomon 1990; Rosman et al. 1999; Bonner 2008).  
However, such analyses using archival data are rare.  In particular, archival analyses of the going 
concern opinion have not prominently explored how the auditor utilizes the most prominent 
indicators of financial distress (i.e. constrained cash and high leverage) differently under different 
environments.  My results demonstrate that managerial ability moderates the sensitivity of the 




experimental literature, my work provides evidence that the auditor’s decision-making process is 
best-described as non-compensatory rather than compensatory (Bonner 2008).   
The results demonstrate the value of modeling interactions between a variable of interest and 
prominently-identified determinants of the auditor’s opinion when there is reason to believe that 
the variable of interest changes the environment in which the auditor forms his or her reporting 
decision.  Future research models that do not allow interactions between financial condition 
information and environmental conditions may be miss-specified and fail to capture the dynamic 
nature of the audit environment.  My work motivates researchers to explore how the auditor’s 
utilization of financial condition information varies according to pervasive firm-level 
characteristics (e.g. historical trends), environment characteristics (e.g. regime changes or 
economic conditions), and auditor characteristics (e.g. industry specialization).  While some of 
these characteristics have been included as determinants in traditional linear models, the literature 
would benefit from models that examine their dynamic impact on the auditor’s utilization of 
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Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
GCAR 0.080 0.271 0.008 0.089 0.200 0.400 0.191 ***
MGRL ABILITY ‐0.012 0.151 0.016 0.140 ‐0.058 0.158 ‐0.074 ***
SIZE 5.381 2.256 6.273 1.959 3.903 1.912 ‐2.371 ***
CASH 0.226 0.235 0.172 0.182 0.317 0.281 0.145 ***
LEV 0.547 0.468 0.491 0.281 0.640 0.661 0.149 ***
CLEV 0.004 0.273 ‐0.013 0.137 0.034 0.406 0.047 ***
LOSS 0.408 0.491 0.130 0.336 0.867 0.339 0.737 ***
OCF 0.028 0.856 0.366 0.373 ‐0.533 1.102 ‐0.898 ***
ZSCORE 0.825 0.891 0.556 0.771 1.269 0.899 0.713 ***
BIGN 0.691 0.462 0.794 0.405 0.522 0.500 ‐0.272 ***
SIGNIFICANCE 0.107 0.196 0.106 0.189 0.109 0.206 0.003
SPECIALIST 0.121 0.327 0.151 0.358 0.073 0.260 ‐0.078 ***
TENURE 8.732 7.474 9.872 8.270 6.845 5.420 ‐3.028 ***






































































































































































































































































Intercept ‐4.613 154.2 *** ‐4.413 136.1 *** 30.911 0.0
MGRL ABILITY (‐) ‐0.909 14.2 *** ‐0.902 13.3 *** ‐99.69 3.0 *
NEG SIZE (+) 0.406 176.0 *** 0.455 201.8 *** 10.400 4.3 **
NEG CASH (+) 2.428 174.8 *** 2.382 162.3 *** 37.227 1.3
LEV (+) 0.730 112.7 *** 0.630 84.0 *** ‐4.682 0.6
CLEV (+) 0.079 2.8 * 0.073 2.4 20.739 2.1
LOSS (+) 0.629 15.4 *** 0.591 13.3 *** 28.853 0.0
NEG OCF (+) 0.415 172.1 *** 0.392 149.7 *** 6.378 0.4
ZSCORE (+) 0.823 186.2 *** 0.821 179.6 *** 20.933 1.9
BIGN (+) 0.112 1.0 0.092 0.7 3.498 0.4
SIGNIFICANCE (‐) 0.008 0.0 0.025 0.0 160.900 3.0 *
SPECIALIST (+) 0.234 1.8 0.339 3.7 * 22.499 0.0
TENURE (?) 0.015 3.2 * 0.017 4.0 ** 0.444 0.1
REPORT LAG (+) 0.012 112.1 *** 0.012 111.2 *** ‐0.403 1.0
GCAR t‐1 (+) 2.848 1066.5 *** 2.866 1054.2 *** 49.217 4.6 **






















































Intercept ‐4.682 156.0 ***
MGRL ABILITY (‐) 0.972 0.9
NEG SIZE (+) 0.402 164.8 *** ‐0.069 0.2
NEG CASH (+) 2.291 148.5 *** ‐2.826 11.3 ***
LEV (+) 0.731 115.4 *** ‐0.718 4.8 **
CLEV (+) 0.080 2.8 * ‐0.274 2.2
LOSS (+) 0.669 16.5 *** 0.104 0.0
NEG OCF (+) 0.402 127.9 *** ‐0.376 5.2 **
ZSCORE (+) 0.784 162.7 *** ‐1.354 18.5 ***
BIGN (+) 0.095 0.7
SIGNIFICANCE (+) 0.005 0.0
SPECIALIST (+) 0.254 2.1
TENURE (?) 0.016 3.9 **
REPORT LAG (+) 0.012 109.2 ***



































Intercept ‐4.610 153.2 ***
MGRL ABILITY (‐) ‐0.651 2.2
NEG SIZE (+) 0.405 174.9 ***
NEG CASH (+) 2.424 174.0 ***
LEV (+) 0.732 112.7 ***
CLEV (+) 0.078 2.7 *
LOSS (+) 0.630 15.4 ***
NEG OCF (+) 0.415 171.7 ***
ZSCORE (+) 0.824 186.3 ***
BIGN (+) 0.109 0.8 ‐0.065 0.0
SIGNIFICANCE (‐) ‐0.012 0.0 ‐0.552 0.4
SPECIALIST (+) 0.217 1.0 ‐0.110 0.0
TENURE (?) 0.013 2.2 ‐0.023 0.2
REPORT LAG (+) 0.012 112.4 ***


































Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Intercept ‐4.508 137.5 *** ‐1.809 0.0 ‐4.642 133.5 *** 10.688 0.0
MGRL ABILITY (‐) ‐0.695 8.0 *** ‐8.470 2.5 ‐1.231 14.6 *** ‐23.057 5.4 **
NEG SIZE (+) 0.438 180.7 *** 1.620 3.1 * 0.451 176.5 *** 3.238 2.8 *
NEG CASH (+) 2.356 151.6 *** 7.350 1.9 2.267 131.2 *** 10.319 1.8
LEV (+) 0.618 78.1 *** ‐0.036 0.0 0.678 83.6 *** ‐1.935 1.5
CLEV (+) 0.055 1.2 2.745 1.7 0.058 1.1 7.436 2.5
LOSS (+) 0.653 15.7 *** 17.795 0.0 0.593 12.1 *** 15.110 0.0
NEG OCF (+) 0.414 159.3 *** 1.483 1.7 0.408 135.7 *** 1.810 1.5
ZSCORE (+) 0.799 157.4 *** 4.164 2.2 0.776 133.2 *** 9.538 2.5
BIGN (+) 0.049 0.2 2.718 1.3 0.086 0.5 0.145 0.0
SIGNIFICANCE (‐) ‐0.064 0.1 34.593 5.2 ** ‐0.039 0.0 46.690 4.3 **
SPECIALIST (+) 0.349 3.8 * ‐4.085 0.0 0.352 3.7 * ‐9.298 0.0
TENURE (?) 0.015 3.3 * ‐0.204 1.0 0.017 3.8 * ‐0.104 0.2
REPORT LAG (+) 0.013 120.7 *** ‐0.052 0.7 0.014 120.3 *** ‐0.159 1.6
GCAR t‐1 (+) 2.900 1011.9 *** 7.033 3.5 * 2.940 957.6 *** 17.448 3.3 *































































Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Intercept ‐4.754 158.4 *** ‐4.926 156.5 ***
MGRL ABILITY (‐) 0.850 0.6 0.788 0.3
NEG SIZE (+) 0.389 150.3 *** 0.028 0.0 0.391 137.7 *** ‐0.190 1.1
NEG CASH (+) 2.354 147.3 *** ‐1.063 1.4 2.217 117.7 *** ‐1.919 2.9 *
LEV (+) 0.715 106.4 *** ‐0.935 8.1 *** 0.767 109.2 *** ‐1.011 4.9 **
CLEV (+) 0.068 1.7 ‐0.521 4.8 ** 0.067 1.4 ‐0.900 7.1 ***
LOSS (+) 0.713 19.1 *** 0.618 0.4 0.670 15.7 *** 0.378 0.1
NEG OCF (+) 0.447 154.6 *** ‐0.135 0.6 0.446 117.1 *** ‐0.161 0.5
ZSCORE (+) 0.779 148.8 *** ‐0.910 7.5 *** 0.742 119.5 *** ‐1.510 12.0 ***
BIGN (+) 0.058 0.3 0.099 0.7
SIGNIFICANCE (+) ‐0.064 0.1 ‐0.035 0.0
SPECIALIST (+) 0.243 1.9 0.253 1.9
TENURE (?) 0.015 3.1 * 0.016 3.8 *
REPORT LAG (+) 0.013 123.6 *** 0.013 123.8 ***
















































Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Intercept ‐4.712 155.0 *** ‐4.829 149.8 ***
MGRL ABILITY (‐) ‐0.149 0.1 ‐1.087 3.4 *
NEG SIZE (+) 0.386 153.3 *** 0.401 152.5 ***
NEG CASH (+) 2.409 163.3 *** 2.318 141.7 ***
LEV (+) 0.723 106.6 *** 0.784 111.9 ***
CLEV (+) 0.061 1.4 0.066 1.4
LOSS (+) 0.688 17.8 *** 0.615 13.3 ***
NEG OCF (+) 0.440 183.2 *** 0.435 157.1 ***
ZSCORE (+) 0.808 164.7 *** 0.787 140.8 ***
BIGN (+) 0.041 0.1 ‐0.553 0.9 0.151 1.4 0.383 0.3
SIGNIFICANCE (+) ‐0.135 0.5 ‐1.852 4.4 ** ‐0.052 0.1 ‐0.559 0.2
SPECIALIST (+) 0.200 0.8 ‐0.136 0.0 0.216 0.9 ‐0.079 0.0
TENURE (?) 0.013 2.2 ‐0.008 0.0 0.014 2.0 ‐0.024 0.1
REPORT LAG (+) 0.013 122.6 *** 0.013 121.9 ***










































Factors Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative
FACTOR 1 1.8262 0.2609 0.2609
FACTOR 2 1.5660 0.2237 0.4846
FACTOR 3 1.0231 0.1462 0.6308
FACTOR 4 0.9287 0.1327 0.7634
FACTOR 5 0.6392 0.0913 0.8547
FACTOR 6 0.5889 0.0841 0.9389
FACTOR 7 0.4278 0.0611 1.0000
Variables FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
NEG SIZE 0.4219 0.5780 ‐0.5509
NEG CASH 0.4717 ‐0.5779 ‐0.1761
LEV 0.7824 0.0756 ‐0.2762
CLEV 0.4600 ‐0.1191 0.2721
LOSS 0.2751 0.4897 0.6660
NEG OCF ‐0.2805 0.7821 ‐0.1301












Intercept ‐4.554 209.1 *** ‐4.578 210.4 ***
MGRL ABILITY (‐) ‐1.279 30.0 *** ‐0.774 7.7 ***
FACTOR 1 (+) 1.511 731.8 *** 1.475 699.6 *** ‐1.645 40.0 ***
FACTOR 2 (+) 0.799 319.6 *** 0.818 310.5 *** ‐0.406 3.2 *
FACTOR 3 (+) ‐0.486 85.8 *** ‐0.468 78.5 *** 0.222 1.0
BIGN (+) 0.044 0.2 0.051 0.2
SIGNIFICANCE (+) 0.033 0.0 0.043 0.1
SPECIALIST (+) 0.198 1.3 0.223 1.7
TENURE (?) 0.016 4.0 ** 0.017 4.4 **
REPORT LAG (+) 0.013 141.1 *** 0.013 137.6 ***
















































Intercept ‐6.790 81.0 *** ‐6.552 72.0 *** ‐230.3 0.0
MGRL ABILITY (‐) ‐0.931 14.7 *** ‐0.934 14.1 *** ‐134.70 6.7 ***
NEG SIZE (+) 0.508 132.3 *** 0.553 146.8 *** 22.396 3.5 *
NEG CASH (+) 2.467 177.3 *** 2.426 165.6 *** 33.708 0.7
LEV (+) 0.703 103.6 *** 0.607 77.3 *** 5.247 0.1
CLEV (+) 0.065 1.8 0.060 1.6 ‐4.324 0.0
LOSS (+) 0.605 14.1 *** 0.568 12.1 *** 8.431 0.0
NEG OCF (+) 0.408 164.2 *** 0.385 142.9 *** 7.573 0.5
ZSCORE (+) 0.800 172.6 *** 0.796 165.9 *** 12.788 0.4
LAUDIT (+) 0.216 10.9 *** 0.212 9.9 *** 25.585 0.9
BIGN (+) ‐0.002 0.0 ‐0.019 0.0 ‐7.437 0.2
SIGNIFICANCE (‐) 0.013 0.0 0.031 0.0 125.00 3.2 *
SPECIALIST (+) 0.247 2.0 0.350 3.9 ** 35.244 0.9
TENURE (?) 0.016 3.9 ** 0.018 4.6 ** 1.258 0.5
REPORT LAG (+) 0.012 104.8 *** 0.012 105.2 *** ‐0.407 1.2
GCAR t‐1 (+) 2.840 1056.6 *** 2.856 1042.8 *** 52.953 4.6 **












































Intercept ‐6.930 83.0 ***
MGRL ABILITY (‐) 1.018 0.9
NEG SIZE (+) 0.509 127.3 *** ‐0.054 0.1
NEG CASH (+) 2.335 151.5 *** ‐2.754 10.6 ***
LEV (+) 0.701 105.1 *** ‐0.697 4.4 **
CLEV (+) 0.067 1.9 ‐0.278 2.3
LOSS (+) 0.649 15.4 *** 0.028 0.0
NEG OCF (+) 0.394 121.2 *** ‐0.368 4.9 **
ZSCORE (+) 0.758 149.5 *** ‐1.327 17.4 ***
LAUDIT (+) 0.224 11.5 ***
BIGN (+) ‐0.021 0.0
SIGNIFICANCE (+) 0.008 0.0
SPECIALIST (+) 0.265 2.3
TENURE (?) 0.018 4.6 **
REPORT LAG (+) 0.012 101.0 ***






































Intercept ‐6.787 80.8 ***
MGRL ABILITY (‐) ‐0.644 2.2
NEG SIZE (+) 0.507 131.7 ***
NEG CASH (+) 2.463 176.5 ***
LEV (+) 0.705 103.5 ***
CLEV (+) 0.064 1.8
LOSS (+) 0.607 14.2 ***
NEG OCF (+) 0.408 163.6 ***
ZSCORE (+) 0.800 172.6 ***
LAUDIT (+) 0.216 10.9 ***
BIGN (+) ‐0.008 0.0 ‐0.106 0.0
SIGNIFICANCE (‐) ‐0.009 0.0 ‐0.604 0.5
SPECIALIST (+) 0.219 1.0 ‐0.209 0.0
TENURE (?) 0.015 2.8 * ‐0.024 0.2
REPORT LAG (+) 0.012 105.1 ***



































Intercept ‐4.683 155.4 ***
MGRL ABILITY (‐) 1.027 0.8
NEG SIZE (+) 0.400 159.6 *** ‐0.094 0.3
NEG CASH (+) 2.286 146.9 *** ‐2.866 11.1 ***
LEV (+) 0.732 115.4 *** ‐0.708 4.6 **
CLEV (+) 0.080 2.8 * ‐0.265 2.1
LOSS (+) 0.671 16.6 *** 0.105 0.0
NEG OCF (+) 0.401 127.2 *** ‐0.374 5.1 **
ZSCORE (+) 0.784 162.5 *** ‐1.352 18.4 ***
BIGN (+) 0.082 0.5 ‐0.194 0.1
SIGNIFICANCE (+) ‐0.004 0.0 ‐0.297 0.1
SPECIALIST (+) 0.222 1.1 ‐0.265 0.1
TENURE (?) 0.016 3.3 * ‐0.005 0.0
REPORT LAG (+) 0.012 109.0 ***



































Intercept ‐4.359 130.1 *** ‐7.106 4.6 **
MGRL ABILITY (‐) ‐0.888 12.5 *** ‐4.907 7.8 ***
NEG SIZE (+) 0.453 195.4 *** 0.438 4.4 **
NEG CASH (+) 2.444 165.1 *** 2.482 4.1 **
LEV (+) 0.630 82.5 *** 1.408 4.1 **
CLEV (+) 0.065 1.9 0.174 0.0
LOSS (+) 0.574 12.2 *** 1.722 0.9
NEG OCF (+) 0.392 146.2 *** 0.710 6.1 **
ZSCORE (+) 0.824 175.6 *** 0.829 2.3
BIGN (+) 0.104 0.8 1.181 2.6
SIGNIFICANCE (‐) 0.073 0.2 ‐1.480 1.2
SPECIALIST (+) 0.326 3.3 * 1.763 0.8
TENURE (?) 0.016 3.5 * 0.039 0.4
REPORT LAG (+) 0.012 103.7 *** 0.049 10.4 ***
GCAR t‐1 (+) 2.888 1050.5 *** 4.264 14.9 ***
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